ENGINEERING
An AI that can isolate machines needs to be engineered like any other security control. This page explains the design choices that keep it predictable, auditable and safe to run on real networks.
ARCHITECTURE
Agents never call a tool directly. They ask the capability registry, which checks the tenant's grants and policy, requires a human approval for anything that changes a system, picks the connector, and writes the audit record.
Plan the work and explain it. They can only ask for capabilities.
Called from the cloud or from the on-site Collector.
DESIGN DECISIONS
Containment proposals come from fixed rules over the risk score, the investigation's threat likelihood and threat-intel verdicts. The model explains and summarises; it cannot pick an action.
An approval names one action and one exact target. It is consumed before the action runs, so a retry or a different target needs a fresh human decision.
When a real EDR is connected, an approved action can never fall back to the simulator. A failure is shown as a failure, never as a success that did nothing.
If two active devices share a name, NexSOC refuses to isolate either and asks an analyst. Isolating the wrong machine is worse than waiting a minute.
Connectors store only the name of an environment variable. Each customer can reference only its own variables, and platform credentials are off limits.
Every tool call records whether it found evidence, found nothing, failed or was denied. An unavailable tool is never reported as a clean result.
CONTAINMENT
STACK
Small, well-understood parts that a customer's security team can review, and that run the same on a laptop as in the cloud.
WHAT'S NEXT
Deployed from GitHub Actions with no SSH and no long-lived keys.
Managed models reached through the server's own AWS role.
Per customer and per action, for pilots that want proposals before execution.
Disable a compromised account and end its sessions in Microsoft Entra ID.
Questions about the design, a pilot, or working together are all welcome.